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I. STATUTE OF FrtAUDs
Both the one year provision and the sale of goods provision of the
Statute of Frauds were construed in Anderson-Gregory Co. v. Lea.'
Regarding the duration of the contract, the facts in the opinion are
somewhat sparse. The plaintiff had orally agreed to furnish to the
defendant certain equipment for the transportation and production of
gravel, and to supervise the removing of gravel from a pit. When
sued for breach of contract, one defense interposed was the one year
provision of the Statute of Frauds. Tennessee, in common with most
states, has a statute providing, in part, that no action shall be brought:
Upon any agreement or contract which is not to be performed within the
space of one (1) year from the making thereof; unless the promise or
agreement, upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum
or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged
therewith, or some other person by him thereunto lawfully authorized.2
The court held that the contract did not come within this provision
of the statute. If a contract could have been performed, under its
terms, within a year from the time of its making, it is not within the
Statute of Frauds, even though it is improbable that the contract
would be performed within a year.3 No facts appear in the court's
opinion to indicate that the contract in question could not have been
performed, under its terms, within one year from the time of its
making. The result of the case in this regard appears clearly correct.
A second defense interposed was the Statute of Frauds applicable
to the sale of goods. Thirty-seven states, including Tennessee, have
adopted some form of the Statute of Frauds provision of the Uniform
Sales Act. The Tennessee statute provides:
A contract to sell or a sale of any goods or choses in action of the value
of five hundred dollars ($500) or upwards shall not be enforceable by
action unless the buyer shall accept part of the goods or choses in action so
Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. 370 S.W.2d 934 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1963).
2. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-201 (1956).
3. See ConmiN, 2 ComRAcTs § 444 (1950); 3 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs § 495 (3d ed.
1960).
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contracted to be sold, or sold, and actually receive the same, or give some-
thing in earnest to bind the contract, or in part payment, or unless some
note or memorandum in writing of the contract or sale be signed by the
party to be charged or his agent in that behalf.
4
Of course, a basic question in resolving the defense of this section
is whether the item sold constitutes "goods" within the meaning of
the statute, so as to make the oral contract unenforceable. The Uni-
form Sales Act provides that an item is not within the statute if the
goods are to be manufactured by the seller especially for the buyer
and are "not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the
seller's business."5 While adopting part of the Uniform Sales Act sec-
tion the Tennessee legislature did not, for some reason, adopt the
foregoing provision describing the type of goods not falling within
the statute. Nevertheless, the court in the case at hand applied essen-
tially the same definition of goods as that found in the Uniform Sales
Act.
It will be noticed that, under the Uniform Sales Act, items are
not within the Statute of Frauds if the goods are "not suitable for sale
to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business." That, of
course, is a factual determination. However, goods of standard type
in the seller's business are within the Statute of Frauds. It does not
matter that the reason for making the goods was to fill the buyer's
order; the Statute of Frauds is applicable, and an oral contract is
unenforceable if the goods will sell in the ordinary course of the
seller's business. 6 Even though the goods are made for buyer's special
order, if the seller can at little expense change them so that they will
be usable in ordinary course in seller's business, the Statute of Frauds
is applicable and the oral contract is unenforceable7
It is not possible to tell from the court's opinion in this case whether
the personal property items involved in the oral contract constituted
goods within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds. To be sure, as
the court points out, seller agreed to furnish certain equipment for
the transportation and production of gravel to be used by the buyer.
But that leaves unanswered the essential question of whether these
4. TFNN. CODE: ANN. § 47-1204 (1956).
5. UNiFoRm SALES AcT § 4(z).
6. Saco-Lowell Shops v. Clinton Mills Co., 277 Fed. 349 (1st Cir. 1921) (cotton
mill machinery); Marilyn Shoe Co. v. Martin's Shoe Store, Inc., 253 S.W.2d 18 (Ky.
1952) (shoes made to order for buyer but according to designs and models in use by
seller in ordinary course of business); Berman Stores v. Hirsh, 240 N.Y. 209, 148 N.E.
212 (1925) (men's suits of usual sizes and models, with defendant's labels attached
but easily removable).
7. Bauer v. Victory Catering Co., 101 N.J.L. 364, 128 At. 262 (Ct. Err. & App.
1925) (silverware made with buyer's initial crest stamped thereon, but removable at




goods were suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of seller's
business. If they were so suitable for sale, the Statute of Frauds is
applicable and the oral contract is unenforceable, even though the
goods were especially produced for the buyer.
It should be pointed out, however, that the recent adoption by
Tennessee of the Uniform Commercial Code changes this exception
from the Statute of Frauds for goods to be specially manufactured. As
provided by the Uniform Commercial Code, adopted in Tennessee,
even if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and
are not suitable for resale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's
business, the oral contract is not enforceable unless the manufacturer
has made either a substantial beginning of the manufacture of the
goods or commitments for the procurement of the goods before there
is a repudiation of the oral agreement.8
II. CONSTRUCTION
The Tennessee Supreme Court case of Oman Construction Co. v.
Tennessee Central Ry.9 raises an interesting and somewhat unusual
question relative to the rule that several contracts relating to one
transaction are to be construed together. The suit grows out of dam-
ages sustained in the construction of a sewer under the freight depot
of the plaintiff, Tennessee Central Railway Company. The City of
Nashville was causing the sewer to be constructed. Defendants Oman
Construction Company, McKenzie Construction Company and Gold-
berg were held liable to plaintiff in the two lower courts. On appeal,
the supreme court exonerated Goldberg from liability, holding Mc-
Kenzie and Oman liable.
In August, 1952, Goldberg (a firm of architects-engineers) was
employed by the City of Nashville as engineers in connection with the
construction of a sewage collection and disposal system for the city.
Under the terms of this contract Goldberg was to review and report
on designs for the sewage system and to supervise and inspect the
proposed construction work. In short, under Goldberg's contract with
the city, ther former was to be the supervising engineer of the con-
struction of the sewer system.
Nearly two years later (May, 1954), the City of Nashville entered
into a contract with the plaintiff (Tennessee Central Railway), which
thereunder gave an easement to the city, its servants, agents and/or
contractors to construct, operate and maintain a sewer across plain-
tiffs premises. This contract also provided that "all expenses in con-
nection with the construction of said sewer, or damage to facilities
8. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-201(3) (a) (1964). For a fuller consideration of the
matter, see Bigham, Tennessee Law and the Sales Article of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 17 VAND. L. REv. 873, 879 (1964).
9. 370 S.W.2d 563 (Tenn. 1963).
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of the Railway as a consequence of said construction or operation is
to be borne by the City of Nashville, its servants, agents and/or con-
tractors."
In June, 1954, the city entered into a contract with Oman for the
construction of the sewer in question. In this contract it was provided
that all work was to be done under the supervision of the engineer
(Goldberg) and to his satisfaction; Goldberg was to decide all ques-
tions as to quality and acceptability of materials, work performed,
manner of performance, rate of progress, etc. Oman's contract with
the city also made it clear that Oman should be solely responsible
for all damage or injury to property of any character resulting from
any negligence in the manner or method of executing the work. It
was specifically provided that Oman should be liable for all injury
caused by blasting, and that the city should be saved wholly harmless
by Oman. Regarding sewers in tunnels, the contract between Oman
and the city specifically provided that Oman should be liable for
all damages.
In one count of its declaration, plaintiff alleged that all three de-
fendants (Oman, McKenzie and Goldberg) breached the foregoing
contracts and that the building and platforms and tracks of plaintiff
were caused to sink and were damaged as a result of such breach of
contract; and that this damage came within the provisions of the con-
tract of May, 1954, between the city and plaintiff, the obligations of
which were assumed by Oman and McKenzie and that it was also
within the provisions of the contract between Oman and the city.
Plaintiff also alleged that Goldberg was bound by the terms of the
contract between the city and plaintiff; that the damage was done by
Oman and McKenzie under the supervision of Goldberg; and that
Goldberg breached his own contract by permitting the breach of con-
tract by Oman and McKenzie.
A second count of plaintiff's declaration was in tort and based upon
alleged acts of negligence. It charged Oman and McKenzie with
specific acts of negligence and alleged that Goldberg was negligent
in the supervision of the work by allowing and approving the negli-
gent and careless acts of the contractors, Oman and McKenzie. All
defendants demurred to the declaration. The demurrers were over-
ruled and all defendants were held liable in a trial of the matter by
the lower courts.
On appeal, the supreme court held that Goldberg was not liable to
plaintiff. The court could find no provision in Goldberg's contract
with the city or in the contract between Oman and the city or in the
contract between the plaintiff and the city which expressly provides
for any contractual liability on the part of Goldberg to the plaintiff.
The city saw fit, said the court, to place solely on Oman the responsi-
19641
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bilities undertaken by it in its contract with plaintiff. The court con-
cluded that it was necessary to examine all of the contracts to deter-
mine what were the rights and obligations of the respective parties to
this litigation. Contracts relating to one transaction are to be con-
strued together. Construing the contracts relied upon in conformity
with this rule, the court said that the city's contract with Goldberg
is for the benefit of the city alone. It clearly appears, said the court,
that all obligations to pay damages or to indemnify the city or restore
damaged property are made the obligation of Oman alone and no such
obligations are placed upon Goldberg in the contract between Oman
and the city.
To be sure, the contract between Oman and the city does not pur-
port to place any obligation upon Goldberg. Indeed, it would be most
difficult for the city and Oman by their contract made after Goldberg
was hired to saddle Goldberg with an obligation. By the same token,
it is difficult to see how plaintiff's claim against Goldberg can be
affected by the contract between city and Oman in which Oman
agreed to be solely responsible for any damages done in building the
sewer. Plaintiff was in no sense a party to the subsequent agreement
by which Oman promised the city to assume full liability for any
damages done.
After finding that the contract between Goldberg and the city did
not give plaintiff any contractual fights against Goldberg, the court
held, quite properly it seems, that plaintiff was a third party bene-
ficiary of Oman's contract with the city; hence plaintiff bad a cause
of action against Oman for breach of contract.10
III. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
The Tennessee Court of Appeals case of Turner v. Zager" involves
some rather interesting points concerning the specific performance of
a contract to sell shares in a close corporation, where the seller re-
tained the right to repurchase the shares, and both parties reserved the
right to terminate the agreement on ten days notice.
The defendant-seller, as part of an arrangement whereby plaintiff
would continue to work for the Fairfax Corporation, gave plaintiff
the option to purchase sixty shares of stock in Fairfax, a close corpora-
tion, in which defendant was the principal stockholder. The option
was not immediately exercised by plaintiff and defendant, pursuant
to a term of the agreement containing the option, notified plaintiff
10. La Mourea v. Rhude, 209 Minn. 53, 295 N.W. 304 (1940). The court sustained
Goldberg's demurrer to plaintiff's count in his declaration charging Goldberg in tort,
on the ground that the count in tort was improperly joined with the count wherein
other defendants were sued in contract.
11. 363 S.W.2d 512 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1962).
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that he (defendant) was cancelling the transaction. The agreement
provided that it could be terminated by either party with or without
cause on ten days notice. Within ten days after plaintiff received the
notice of cancellation, he notified defendant that he was prepared
to exercise his right to purchase the sixty shares of stock. Defendant
refused to deliver the shares, and plaintiff brought suit for specific
performance.
The court held that since this was a close corporation, plaintiff was
entitled to specific performance, as plaintiff could not buy shares in
the corporation elsewhere. The court properly took the position that
when defendant granted plaintiff, for a valuable consideration, the
option to purchase the shares, that created an irrevocable offer, which,
on acceptance in accordance with its terms, gives rise to a contract.
The attempted cancellation did not destroy plaintiff's power to exer-
cise the option within ten days after the defendant gave plaintiff
notice of the termination. The option given plaintiff by defendant
was, itself, a contract to keep an offer open.
12
By way of defense, defendant also urged that his (defendant's)
right to repurchase the shares should defeat plaintiff's remedy. The
court refused to accept this argument saying:
We cannot accept the argument since defendant has the option to repur-
chase the stock he has the power to negate a decree of specific performance.
He has no power to exercise the option unless he, himself, transferred the
stock to complainant.
Defendant cannot negate specific performance because he terminated the
contract upon which he must rely for the right to repurchase. Having
terminated the contract, there is no contract in existence. If he desired to
take advantage of the contract provision permitting him to repurchase, he
should have done this upon receiving complainant's acceptance and prior
to the termination of the contract in accordance with his own act.
13
A question or two might be asked regarding the logic of this reason-
ing. First, how could defendant have exercised his right to repurchase
"'upon receiving complainant's acceptance and prior to the termination
of the contract in accordance with his (defendant's) own act?" De-
fendant had given his notice of termination ("his own act") before
plaintiff had ever exercised his option to purchase the shares. Hence,
it was impossible for defendant to have repurchased the shares before
plaintiff had purchased them. Does not this reasoning by the court
also mean that defendant could not have repurchased the shares, even
if he had tried to do so within the ten day cancellation period before
termination became effective? The court also says that since defend-
12. See 1 WiLLIS-oN, CoNTRAcTs § § 61-61D (3d ed. 1957), for a discussion of the
nature of an option and the circumstances making it irrevocable.
13. Turner v. Zager, supra note 11, at 518.
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ant had terminated the contract, there is no contract in existence.
Yet, the court did specifically enforce the contract against defendant.
Somehow, a contract of some sort must have remained in existence.
Moreover, does not this reasoning defeat one of the purposes of the
agreement, which was to permit the defendant to keep this a close
corporation?
IV. EXCULPATORY CONTRACTS
Smith v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co.14 presents the
question whether a telephone company can, by contracting in ad-
vance, limit its future liability for its negligence with respect to adver-
tisements in the classified directory or "yellow pages." The plaintiff
had been advertising in the yellow pages of the defendant's telephone
directories for a number of years. As part of plaintiff's contract with
the defendant telephone company there was a provision limiting de-
fendant's liability for mistakes in the advertising to seventy-five
dollars. The advertisement in the "yellow pages" of defendant, placed
there by plaintiff, a florist, was in error. As a result of the error, plain-
tiff claimed substantial damages.
The sole issue was whether this contractual provision limiting
defendant's liability is contrary to public policy and, therefore, invalid.
The court held that this exculpatory clause in the contract between
the parties was valid.
Normally exculpatory contracts by which common carriers and
other public service corporations, such as the defendant, undertake to
contract away their liability in advance for their negligent conduct
will be held against public policy and invalid.15 Various reasons are
given for striking down such exculpatory clauses. One is the inequality
of bargaining power of the parties. A carrier of public service com-
pany with its monopoly has the power to exact a contract that is
most favorable to it; on the other hand, the other party must either
agree to relieve the carrier or public service company of liability for
its negligence or refuse to agree at the risk of great inconvenience.
Too, the incentive to use due care would be destroyed if harm can
be inflicted with impunity by a carrier or public service company
because of the relieving clause.
However, as the court in the case at hand properly points out, where
a common carrier or public utility is not acting in the discharge of its
duty as a carrier or utility, it may validly contract against liability for
14. 364 S.W.2d 952 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).
15. Fairfax Gas & Supply Co. v. Hadary, 151 F.2d 939 (4th Cir. 1945) (gas com-
pany); Pierce v. Southern Pac. Co., 120 Cal. 156, 47 Pac. 874 (1897); Shellabarger
Elevator Co. v. Illinois C.R.R., 278 Ill. 333, 116 N.E. 170 (1917); Turner v. Southern
Power Co., 154 N.C. 131, 69 S.E. 767 (1910) (electric company); 6 WILLISTON,
CoNTRAcrs § 1751C (3d ed. 1957); Annot., 175 A.L.R. 8, 38-39 (1948).
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its future negligent conduct. 16 Southern Bell presumably is not acting
in the discharge of its duty as a utility by printing plaintiff's advertise-
ments in Southern Bell's "yellow pages." Tested by the criteria usually
employed by the courts in determining the validity of contractual
clauses relieving against liability for the consequences of negligence,
the exculpatory clause in the Southern Bell case would be sustained.
However, there still remains a rather forceful argument against the
validity of such exculpatory clauses. The incentive to use due and
reasonable care is, in part, destroyed. The party knows that he has
been given an immunity bath from liability for the consequences of his
negligence through the contract, which has insulated him from the
payment of damages for future injury suffered by the other party.17
16. Baltimore & O.S.R.R. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498 (1899); see Ringling Bros.-Barnum
& Bailey Combined Shows v. Olivera, 119 F.2d 584, 587 (9th Cir. 1941).
17. Elsewhere the writer has discussed exculpatory contracts in considerably more
detail. See Hartman, Tennessee Survey 1960-Contracts, 14 VAND. L. REv. 1207
(1961). Minton v. General Shale Prod. Corp., 371 S.W.2d 808 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1962),
involves a question bearing on an illegal agreement. There the court concluded that,
for reasons of policy, agreements between shippers and motor carriers for the payment
of rates varying from those provided in the tariffs or schedules of charges filed with the
Interstate Commerce Commission cannot be recognized nor allowed, nor can any act
or omission of the carrier be permitted to estop it from forcing payment of the full
amount of such transportation charges.
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